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The Western commercial banks were frequently blamed for overly
aggressive lending to Third World borrowers in the 1970s. Over-
lending was considered a major factor in causing the subsequent
widespread debt crises of developing countries. It appears to be
somewhat paradoxical that the drastic change in the lending atti-
tudes of banks since 1982 has added considerably to concerns
about the efficiency of international credit relations. Arguably,
the banks switched from one extreme to another, i.e., from over-
lending to underlending [Guttentag, Herring, 1985]. While even in
1980-82 the developing countries received about US$ 10 billion
annually in net transfers out of bank loans, they suffered from
substantial negative net transfers afterwards . For the 1983-86
period, average annual outflows of about US$ 12 billion were
recorded [World Bank, 1988]. The reluctance of commercial banks
to continue lending may seriously affect the growth prospects of
Third World economies and, hence, the future potential of these
countries to service their external obligations. However, before
judging on the efficiency of international credit relations, the
determinants of the actual lending behaviour of banks have to be
identified in the first place.
It is no longer disputed that risk illusions of creditors played
a crucial role with regard to the generous lending until the
early 19 80s. Credit guarantees provided by both the borrowers
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and the lenders' governments and central banks distorted the
incentives to follow prudent lending strategies. Consequently,
banks did not rigorously discriminate between good and bad credit
risks [Nunnenkamp, 1986a]. However, considerable confusion pre-
vails about the major factors underlying the behaviour of banks
after risk illusions have been destroyed. In the rich body of
theoretical literature it is heavily debated, for example,
whether or not a favourable economic performance of borrowers
Net transfers represent the difference between gross inflows of
credits on the one hand and amortization and interest payments
on the other hand.will induce increased capital inflows. Studies on the empirical
relevance of the various conjectures raised are still lacking.
It is the major aim of the following investigation to narrow this
gap by empirically analyzing the determinants of commercial lend-
ing to developing countries in the 1980s. This is done on the
basis of the hypothesis that the behaviour of private creditors
is no longer subject to the fairly uniform set of incentives
which governed lending to the wide spectrum of Third World bor-
rowers in the 1970s. Evidence suggests that a differentiated
approach is required: Notwithstanding that all major Third World
regions experienced reduced net transfers out of bank credits, it
was mainly Latin America which suffered from considerable out-
flows of private capital; whereas net transfers remained positive
in the case of East Asia [Nunnenkamp, 1988a, Tables 2 and A3],
After the risks in international lending have become evident, the
influence of possible determinants of credit extension is likely
to differ between various types of borrowers. Most importantly, a
distinction between voluntary and involuntary lending seems to be
required. This is because on-lending enforced by public agencies
(including international organizations) and the leading banks
within bank syndicates has gained in importance in the context of
debt rescheduling packages. Lending to developing countries is
thus supposed to take place in different regimes.
The current confusion about the determinants of commercial lend-
ing appears to be largely due to the fact that conflicting hypo-
theses apply to different lending regimes. Consequently, we pro-
ceed by clarifying the most prominent conjectures raised in the
literature (Section II). Section III presents a simple indicator
approach on the basis of which our 36 sample countries are clas-
sified into different lending regimes. Subsequently, the estima-
tion procedure is specified (Section IV) . The empirical results
are discussed in Section V, and conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.II. Conflicting Hypotheses on Bank Behaviour under Different
Lending Regimes
Major lending regimes: Estimating the determinants of lending by
private creditors is complicated by the f'act that different
regimes under which credits are extended have to be considered
[Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz, 1986, pp. 503f.]. Observed lending
is the minimum of credit ceilings imposed by creditors and the
level of debt desired by borrowers. Supply factors are essential
even in the absence of borrowers that are not able or willing to
pay the debt service due. Credit rationing is likely to occur in
markets with imperfect information which render it difficult for
lenders to identify "good borrowers" [Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981].
Potential debtors may be denied loans by creditors even if the
former indicate their willingness to pay more than the currently
prevailing market rates of interest. In this way, lenders limit
the riskiness of loan portfolios arising from adverse selection
among perceptionally identical borrowers.
However, some debtor countries may still be free to borrow up to
the level of desired debt, although Eaton and Gersovitz [1981a]
found the credit constrained regime to be prevalent in 1974 al-
ready. Probably, this applies to borrowers which succeeded to
engage in "cooperative" credit relations with foreign lenders in
the first place. A cooperative equilibrium in lending can be
achieved if the borrower precommits himself to a certain invest-
ment behaviour, in terms of both the amount and riskiness of
investments [for a detailed analysis, see LSchler, 1985]. Such a
precommitment is hardly enforceable by the creditors within the
institutional framework currently underlying the international
transfer of resources [Stiiven, 1988]. But the banks will be pre-
pared to meet the borrower's demand for loans if past experience
makes them confident about the credibility of the borrower. Under
conditions of non-constrained lending, the observed debt flows
are demand determined.The mix of regimes under which lending is taking place has become
more diversified with the emergence of the widespread debt crises
in the early 1980s. Further differentiation seems to be required
with regard to supply factors particularly, i.e., for the group
of credit constrained countries. First, the concept of credit
rationing principally refers to voluntary lending. Recently,
however, involuntary lending has gained in importance. Govern-
ment intervention seems to have overruled the banks
1 risk con-
siderations in the late 1970s and early 1980s already . Subse-
quently, this factor has gathered momentum. Within emergency
actions and rescheduling programs it was mainly the IMF which
pressed banks to continue or even increase lending to major prob-
lem borrowers [see e.g. Kraft, 1984, on the Mexican case]. In the
case of Latin America, spontaneous or voluntary lending accounted
for only 8 per cent of total long-term bank credit commitments in
the 1983-87 period [Watson et al., 1988, Table 5]; concerted
credit extension, as the most prominent type of involuntary lend-
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ing, amounted to US$ 41 billion .
Secondly, the prospects for the resumption of voluntary lending
look more promising for some countries than for others. The most
important problem borrowers did not yet succeed to restore their
international creditworthiness. Nevertheless an attempt is to be
made to isolate the subgroup of constrained borrowers for which
the debt situation improved subsequent to the crisis in the early
1980s. It may well be that lending to this subgroup constitutes a
particular regime.
In a survey conducted by the Group of Thirty [1982], about 25
per cent of bankers responded that loan decisions were influ-
enced considerably by political pressures of creditor govern-
ments.
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Concerted credit extension must not be confused with syndicated
lending which figured prominently until the early 1980s. The
former refers to equiproportional increases in loan exposure,
enforced by public agencies such as the IMF and/or coordinated
by bank advisory committees; whereas individual banks were free
to decide on their participation in syndicated lending.It is in various respects that the determinants of bank behaviour
may differ between the regimes of non-constrained versus con-
strained lending and voluntary versus involuntary lending. Con-
flicting hypotheses have been raised in the literature with
regard to the following aspects particularly, which will be dis-
cussed in turn in the subsequent paragraphs:
- It is debatable whether good economic performance of debtors
leads to reduced or increased capital inflows.
- It is open to question whether or not commercial banks are
prepared to share the risk of external shocks with the borro-
wers, i.e., to increase lending temporarily when borrowers are
hit by negative world market developments.
- The impact of sovereign risk and the relative bargaining power
of debtors and lenders on capital flows remains to be clari-
fied.
The impact of domestic policies: It was shown elsewhere that
domestic policies and economic performance of debtors hardly
affected the amount of private capital inflows and the terms
under which bank credits were granted in the late 1970s and early
1980s [Nunnenkamp, 1986a], This may have changed after risk illu-
sions have been destroyed. It is no longer to be disputed that
the borrowers
1 economic policies figured prominently in deter-
mining whether or not external debt became unmanageable . Hence,
since 1982, well performing countries may have access to additio-
nal loans more easily than borrowers which performed less favour-
2 ably, provided that private creditors learnt their lessons . Even
so, the impact of policy and performance variables on capital
flows is likely to remain indeterminate when assessed at the
overall level of all borrowers.
For a discussion of the relevance of domestic policies with
regard to debt problems, see e.g. Baneth [1986]; Khan, Knight
[1983]; Nunnenkamp [1986b]; Zaidi [1985].
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Cohen and Sachs [1986, p. 548] concluded, for example: "The
equilibrium strategy of the lenders makes the growth of debt
contingent on the growth of the borrowing country".In the case of non-constrained borrowers, the observed transfers
are demand determined. The recent reduction of external indebted-
ness in countries such as South Korea and Malaysia exemplifies
the case in point. For this group, it depends on domestic policy
priorities whether the relationship between economic performance
and further debt inflows is positive or negative. The relation-
ship between economic policies and new lending can be expected to
be less ambiguous in the case of constrained borrowers, espec-
ially those which did not benefit from involuntary lending and
which succeeded to improve their debt situation recently. Probab-
ly, these countries are prepared to accept fresh money as soon as
credits become available. An empirical test of the hypothesis
that better policies and improved economic performance encourage
additional lending is required for this group of borrowers par-
ticularly. Such an analysis may help to clarify the current dis-
cussion on whether or not economic adjustment is in the interest
of today's problem borrowers. However, it may still be too early
to arrive at definite conclusions in this respect. The statisti-
cal basis for running empirical tests remains poor due to the
fact that few problem borrowers have embarked on consistent poli-
cy reforms .
The view that additional bank lending to today's problem borro-
wers may be induced by policy adjustment and improved economic
performance has been challenged recently. The counterhypothesis
states that "good performance by a problem debtor leads to re-
Turkey which undertook a far-reaching policy reform in 1980
represents one of the few exceptions. The adjustment measures
had favourable effects on economic performance in the early
1980s, most notably in terms of export expansion and GDP growth
[Balassa, 1986, p. 117]. The economic improvements encouraged
commercial banks to resume voluntary lending. While net bor-
rowing from banks was negative in 1981-82, substantial net
inflows of bank credits were reported since 1983. Currently,
Chile is often considered to regain access to private inter-
national capital markets in the near future. This expectation
is mainly based on the correction of the overvaluation of the
Peso since 1983 and the recent improvement in export per-
formance [Barandiaran, 1988].duced, not increased, capital inflows" [Krugman, 1987b, p. 278],
The reasoning is based on the assumption that current lending to
constrained borrowers is of involuntary nature. It may well be in
the bank syndicate's interest to provide loans involuntarily . In
case of a debt overhang, i.e., when the expected present value of
debt-service payments is substantially below the contractual
value of the country's external debt, additional lending is un-
profitable viewed in isolation. However, throwing good money
after the bad makes sense if it helps to protect existing claims
[Krugman, 1987a]. Additional credits may narrow the gap between
the current market valuation of a country's debt and its con-
tractual value, as reflected in the discounts prevailing in sec-
ondary markets. Consequently, expected losses may be reduced by
involuntary lending. According to this reasoning, the incentive
of bank syndicates to orchestrate fresh money packages is weake-
,ned if the market valuation of external debt improves due to
policy adjustment and better economic performance of the debtor
country. The more the borrower succeeds in raising the valuation
of his debt in the secondary market, the less involuntary lending
is required to reduce the expected losses of creditors. Hence,
involuntary lending is supposed to be negatively related to the
borrowers' adjustment efforts.
This hypothesis has to be qualified, however. Typically, problem
borrowers ask for fresh money from creditors whose claims from
former lending are at stake. This is because lending that is
unprofitable viewed in isolation would not take place if credi-
tors were not engaged in an overindebted country already. In
other words: The incentives for involuntary lending are restric-
ted to the country's current creditors [see also Eaton, Gerso-
vitz, Stiglitz, 1986, p. 496]. Other potential creditors face a
It is important to note that involuntary lending involves a
conflict between the creditors' individual and collective in-
terest. Individual banks have the incentive to opt out of addi-
tional lending and let other creditors carry the burden. The
free-rider problem, which may compromise the ability to achieve
new lending, is typically tackled by concerted actions orga-
nized by the leading banks within the syndicate.completely different incentive structure [Dooley, 1986]. The
market valuation of credits extended voluntarily by new lenders
would become identical to the value of all existing claims. The
higher the current discount on existing debt, the higher the
immediate capital losses of new creditors would be. The willing-
ness of new creditors to engage in voluntary lending to problem
borrowers can thus be expected to be positively related to the
debtors' efforts to raise the market valuation of existing debt
by economic adjustment measures. Whether or not the hypothesis of
a negative relationship holds is likely to depend on the relative
importance of involuntary lending by old creditors and voluntary
lending by potentially new creditors.
Sharing of external shock risks; As in the case of internal poli-
cy adjustment, the impact of external shocks on additional lend-
ing is likely to differ between lending regimes. External shock
risks are mainly due to deteriorating terms of trade, sluggish
world demand for the borrowers' exports, and rising international
interest rates. Unfavourable world market developments can gen-
erally be assumed to add to the demand for foreign capital .
Commercial banks can be expected to fully satisfy the shock-
induced demand of non-constrained borrowers for additional loans.
As far as credit constrained debtors are concerned, two subgroups
of borrowers can be distinguished:
- Large debtors, for which involuntary lending has already been
orchestrated, may find it relatively easy to get additional
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credits when external shocks occur . The argument that highly
The effects of rising international interest rates on the de-
mand for foreign loans are less straightforward, because the
incentives to finance projects out of domestic funds are
strengthened. However, this demand-reducing effect is likely to
be overcompensated. Typically, the debt service for existing
debt is largely financed through further borrowing. Especially
when flexible interest-rate debt figures prominently, the de-
mand for loans is likely to increase with rising interest
rates. Moreover, the chances to mobilize additional domestic
funds in the short run are remote for many developing countries
because of low elasticities of supply of domestic savings.
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The 1987 rescheduling of Mexican debt owed to commercial banks
provides a case in point. An agreement on contingency lending
was part of the deal. In the case of declining oil prices, the
banks were prepared to provide additional credits.exposed banks are interested to protect outstanding claims via
new lending can be advanced in the case of external shocks as
well. However, since new lenders are unlikely to participate,
the shock-induced demand for additional credits may not be met
fully by increased supplies.
- For credit constrained countries which did not benefit from
involuntary lending before, the compensation of external shocks
by additional loans is supposed to be most difficult. Only a
loose - or even a negative - relationship between unfavourable
world market developments and credit extension is to be expec-
ted for this subgroup.
Lending under sovereign risk: The fact that involuntary lending
has been organized by bank syndicates for some, but not for all
problem borrowers strongly points to the relevance of the rela-
tive bargaining power of debtors and lenders in determining the
flow of bank credits in the 1980s. The notion of lending as a
bargaining process [e.g. Bulow, Rogoff, 1986; 1988] refers to the
discussion of sovereign risk in international credit relations
[for an overview, see Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz, 1986], In the
case of sovereign lending, default is not only a matter of the
borrower's ability to service external debt, but also of his
willingness to pay. Contrary to domestic lending contracts, debt
servicing is hardly enforceable by creditors in the international
context. After the contract is concluded and the capital is
transferred, a substantial range of discretion accrues to the
debtor. The honouring of contractual obligations becomes a matter
of cost-benefit calculus [Nunnenkamp, Picht, 1988].
Rational lenders will consider the borrower's incentives to de-
fault, when deciding on whether further credits are granted.
Hence, additional lending is supposed to be negatively related to
the benefits to be reaped by debtors from repudiating external
debt, and positively related to the potential costs of such a
behaviour [Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz, 1986, p. 490]. The borro-
wer's benefits from default mainly depend on the level of accu-10
mulated debt, respectively the debt-service burden. The higher
the discounted net value of contractual obligations is that are
refused to be paid, the higher the benefit is for borrowers which
otherwise would have to forgo domestic resources when the credits
are due [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981b, p. 302]. As far as the costs of
default are concerned, the borrowers have to take into account
the sanctions which may be imposed on them by the creditors
[Sachs, 1984, pp. 17f.]:
- Defaulting countries may be cut off from future borrowing in
international capital markets.
- The debtor's overseas assets may be subject to direct seizure
in the creditor countries.
- Creditor countries may agree on trade embargos as a retaliatory
measure against borrowers that default willfully .
Apparently, the borrowing countries have been aware of those
costs. They avoided to repudiate their debt-service obligations
completely and persistently. However, they used the threat of
outright default to press the banks to participate in debt rene-
gotiations and reschedulings, which typically involved new (in-
voluntary) lending [Sachs, 1981, pp. 199f.; Stiiven, 1988].
Lacking enforceability of claims against sovereign debtors, cre-
ditors agreed to additional lending as part of reschedulings in
order to reduce the probability of unilateral actions taken by
sovereign borrowers and, hence, expected losses. This leads to
the counterhypothesis that, once debt-servicing problems have
emerged, the expectation of default will induce rather than pre-
vent further lending [Krugman, 1987a; Cohen, Sachs, 1986, pp.
539f.].
According to this reasoning, the bargaining power of debtors in
transfer negotiations increases if accumulated debt is high
For a model in which the penalty associated with default de-
pends positively on the importance to a debtor of his opportun-
ity to trade, see Gersovitz [1983].11
enough to pose a serious threat for the creditors' financial
position. Under conditions of a debt overhang, it is considered
to be more favourable for the creditors to grant debt relief,
i.e., to leave the debtor with higher net transfers, than
attempting to get the maximum amount of debt-service payments
from the debtor immediately . It is argued that the incentives of
a debtor country to make adjustment efforts (especially to invest
a larger proportion of domestic absorption) are weakened if the
creditors do not compromise on current debt servicing. The gains
from extra output generated by economic adjustment would accrue
to the creditors exclusively, whereas the debtor would not bene-
fit at all. Since forgone investment negatively affects the deb-
tor's future ability to pay, the lenders will suffer in the
longer run as well. They are thus expected to allow for higher
net transfers, once they are uncertain about whether or not de-
faults will occur when lending is refused.
Moreover, the counterthreat of creditors to impose sanctions is
not believed to be credible. First of all, the effectiveness of
possible sanctions is disputed:
- The argument that countries avoid to default because otherwise
they will face prolonged financial autarky is based on an infi-
nite-horizon reputational model; it is assumed that short-term
consumption smoothing represents the main reason for sovereign
borrowing [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981a], However, "the loans are
patently not short term. It seems totally implausible that the
rulers of these countries have discount rates so low that they
will repay these debts over the next twenty or thirty years,
primarily in order to be eligible to borrow ... again sometime
well into the next decade" [Bulow, Rogoff, 1986, p. 26].
- As far as trade sanctions are concerned, experience suggests
that the effectiveness of embargos is uncertain at best
[Donges, 1982]. Moreover, it depends on the relative lobbying
For a critical evaluation of this reasoning, see Corden [1988];
Nunnenkamp [1988b].12
power of different interest groups in the creditor countries
whether sanctions are introduced altogether.
Secondly, the standard argument that penalties are Pareto im-
proving and well suited to encourage further lending is chal-
lenged because it is purely based on ex-ante considerations. "Ex
post, once the country has borrowed and gotten into trouble, the
ability to penalize can be harmful" [Froot, Scharfstein, Stein,
1988, pp. 17ff.]. The lenders are not interested to realize the
threat of sanctions because higher penalties are likely to render
default more costly to them as well. Rational debtors and lenders
will anticipate the disincentive problems in enforcing sanctions.
The probability of default and, hence, lending decisions are then
unlikely to be influenced by the threat of sanctions [Sachs,
1984, pp. 23ff.].
III. Classification of Sample Countries
The discussion of major hypotheses on the behaviour of private
creditors clearly points out that lending to Third World econo-
mies is unlikely to be governed by a uniform set of incentives.
Hence, different lending regimes have to be defined and the
sample countries have to be categorized before running empirical
estimates. There is little we can refer to in the literature. The
problem of different lending regimes was typically not considered
in the few former cross-country studies that have tried to assess
the determinants of private lending empirically [e.g. Edwards
1984; 1986; Nunnenkamp, 1986a]. A two-regime model presented by
Eaton and Gersovitz [1980; 1981] revealed that most countries
were credit constrained in 1974. However, the fairly sophistica-
ted approach applied to calculate the likelihood that a sample
country was credit constrained yielded extremely implausible
results in many cases . In the following, a rather pedestrian
For example, the probability of being credit constrained was
very low for Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago,
Zaire and Zambia; whereas it was extremely high for South Korea
and Thailand.Bibliothek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
13
approach is applied in order to classify our sample countries
into different lending regimes.
We consider three indicators out of which an overall index
ranging from "0" (lowest probability of supply constraints) to
"9" (highest probability) is constructed, in order to decide
whether or not a debtor country is credit constrained:
- level and change in international reserves held by the debtor
country;
- undisbursed credit commitments as a share of disbursements;
- occurrence and quantitative role of reschedulings.
As concerns international reserves, it has been argued that
"countries which are not credit constrained may have reserve
holding behavior different from that of countries which are
credit constrained" [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1980, p. 5]. Reserves are
supposed to have higher opportunity costs if supply constraints
are binding. Credit constrained countries that want to sustain
imports in the short run have to finance imports out of reserves.
Consequently, international reserves are assumed to be relatively
low and/or to decline in the case of debtors facing credit supply
constraints. In Table 1, one index point is attached to countries
where the average import coverage of reserves was below one month
in the 1980-86 period. This was significantly below the average
import coverage ratio of all developing countries (3.4 months).
Extremely low ratios are assumed to indicate that countries were
supply constrained persistently in the 1980s. Additionally,
changes in per-capita levels of international reserves are cal-
culated, contrasting the two years of the 1982-86 period for
which the indicator was lowest with the average of 1980-81 . The
Reserves per capita are preferred over import coverage of re-
serves in calculating changes in reserve behaviour. This is
because the relative stability of the latter indicator is main-
ly due to significant cuts in imports in many countries, which
were hardly sustainable in the longer run.14
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RES/MGS : International reserves in months of imports of goods and services; period averages.
RES/POP : International reserves per capita (USS); the calculation of changes is for the average of
the two years of the 1982-86 period for which RES/POP was lowest vis-i-vis the average of
1980-81.
COM/DIS : Ratio of commitments to disbursements of public and publicly guaranteed credits raised in
private financial markets (i.e. private creditors without suppliers' credits); this ratio
is considered low if undisbursed commitments as a share of disbursements are less than 5
per cent on an average for 1980-86. The calculation of chances is for the average of the
two years of the 1982-86 period for which undisbursed commitments as a share of disburse-
ments were lowest vis-a-vis the average of 1980-81.
RESCH: Multilateral reschedulings in the 1980-87 period; double counting occurs due to multiple
reschedulings of the same debt; one index point, if the rescheduled amount is below 25 per
cent of outstanding debt in 198 0; two (three) index points, if the rescheduled amount is
25-100 per cent (more than 100 per cent) of outstanding df?bt.
Overall index:
Sum of index points for all indicators considered; index figure? may range from "0"
(lowest probability that a country is credit constrained) to "9" (highest probability that
a country is credit constrained).
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. - Own calculations.15
assumption is that countries for which reserves decreased dras-
tically became credit constrained in the early 1980s. One (two)
index point(s) are attached to cases where the reduction in per-
capita reserves exceeded 30 per cent (50 per cent).
Undisbursed commitments, as a share of disbursements of public
and publicly guaranteed credits raised in private financial mar-
kets, are considered as an additional indicator to classify our
sample into credit constrained and non-constrained countries.
This is because debtors whose demand for new credits exceeds the
ceiling imposed by creditors can be supposed to fully exhaust the
available credit lines; while non-constrained debtors have the
choice to raise fresh money which may be cheaper than drawing on
already existing credit lines. Similar to the reasoning with
respect to reserve holdings, one index point is attached to coun-
tries for which undisbursed commitments were marginal throughout
the 1980-86 period (below 5 per cent of disbursements; all de-
veloping countries: 13 per cent). Additionally, one (two) index
point(s) are attached to cases where the share of undisbursed
commitments in disbursements declined by more than 50 per cent
(80 per cent), contrasting the two years of the 1982-86 period
for which this indicator was lowest with the average of 1980-81
(all developing countries: -57 per cent).
Finally, reschedulings are supposed to indicate that a country is
credit constrained. The lack of access to foreign credits provi-
ded on a voluntary basis may cause the debtor to ask for the
restructuring of old debt, since the debt service due can no
longer be met out of fresh money. In Table 1, one index point is
attached to countries which rescheduled a minor part of their
foreign debt in the 1980-87 period . Two (three) index points are
attached to the country if the rescheduled amount exceeded 25 per
cent (100 per cent) of total debt outstanding in 1980.
One index point is attached to Colombia as well, although the
agreement with its creditors in December 1985 was restricted to
concerted new lending without debt restructuring.16
The overall index given in the last column of Table 1 simply adds
up the index points for the aforementioned indicators. The prob-
ability of being credit constrained is supposed to be high (low)
for debtors with high (low) index figures . With only few excep-
tions, the indicator approach yields fairly plausible results.
This refers particularly to debtors with high index figures which
can safely be assumed to be credit constrained. Some doubts may
be raised whether the loan demand of all countries with low index
figures was fully met by creditors on a voluntary basis; this
applies to Gabon, Honduras, and Kenya especially. The classifi-
cation of the sample countries into the two lending regimes re-
quires tc define a critical index figure. This is of course an
arbitrary exercise. We set the dividing line at an index figure
of "2", i.e. considering all countries with index figures of more
than "2" (less than "3") as supply constrained (non-constrained).
In order to be on the safe side, Gabon, Honduras, and Kenya are
omitted in the regime-specific estimations .
As argued before, different lending regimes may also prevail
within the group of credit constrained debtors. A small group of
countries can be identified for which the indicators pointing to
supply constraints improved in 1985-86 (compared to the average
of the 1980-86 period). For them the prospects for the resumption
of voluntary lending may be relatively good, so that they may
constitute a particular lending regime. The following debtors are
included if we concentrate on countries for which either per-
capita reserve holdings or undisbursed credit commitments as a
The seven remaining countries classified as non-constrained
are: Algeria, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Tunisia,
and Turkey. The plausibility of this classification is further
strengthened when looking at the credit rating of these coun-
tries, as given by the Institutional Investor Magazine. The
first six countries were the only ones among all sample coun-
tries which maintained a favourable rating, i.e. above 40 index
points, throughout the 1983-86 period. In the case of Turkey,
the rating improved most remarkably from 12 index points in
1980 to 38 index points in 1986.17
share of disbursements increased by more than 20 per cent :
2 Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Zaire .
Moreover, some but not all of the supply constrained countries
may have access to fresh money due to the creditors' interest to
protect existing claims. Involuntary lending is supposed to be of
importance if concerted lending activities of Western commercial
banks took place in the 1983-87 period. Concerted lending refers
to equiproportional increases in exposure, coordinated by bank
advisory committees [Watson et al., 1988, p. 24ff.]. Arguably;
involuntary lending may also be of relevance for countries where
concerted arrangements have not been observed. This may apply to
rather small countries where only a small number of banks are
engaged so that formally concerted arrangements are not required
to protect old debts by new lending. Typically, however, a con-
flict between the creditors' individual and collective interest
arises when involuntary lending is asked for. Concerted actions
by bank consortia can be considered to be the most effective
means to overcome the free-rider problem which otherwise may
compromise the ability to achieve desirable new lending [Krugman,
1987a]. It thus seems adequate to assume the regime of involunta-
ry lending to consist of countries for which concerted lending
was arranged by creditor banks. According to the International
Monetary Fund, this was the case for the following 14 debtor
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador,
Reserve holdings or the share of undisbursed credit commitments
improved for Kenya, Thailand, and Turkey as well. However,
these countries could not be considered as credit constrained
according to the overall index presented in Table 1.
2
In terms of the Institutional Investor's credit rating, this
group performed better than the average of credit constrained
borrowers. Colombia maintained a fairly high credit rating
(slightly below 40 index points in 1985-86) , though suffering
considerable losses since the early 1980s. Costa Rica and Zaire
were among the three constrained countries for which the rating
improved slightly in 1985-86, as compared to the low index
values in 1982-83 (Congo being the third country). The rating
of the Dominican Republic and Jamaica remained fairly constant.
For all constrained countries, the rating deteriorated by more
than 9 index points in the 1982-86 period.18
Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines,
Uruguay, and Yugoslavia .
The aforementioned classification of debtors allows us to run
separate regressions on the determinants of bank lending for
groups of countries belonging to different lending regimes. This
is most important since it is to be expected that the factors
determining the behaviour of private creditors differ on whether
or not a borrower is supply constrained and on whether or not
banks are prepared to provide fresh money involuntarily.
IV. Equation Specification
In the following, cross-country regressions are run for a sample
of 36 Third World economies. The most important criterion for the
selection of this sample was that borrowing countries maintained
considerable credit relations with private lenders, especially
commercial banks. The sample covers all major problem borrowers
as well as debtors which did not experience serious payment dif-
ficulties in the 1980s. Moreover, the countries under considera-
tion differ in terms of economic performance and the extent to
which they were hit by unfavourable external shocks. The analysis
covers the 1983-86 period. This is because lending attitudes of
banks have changed drastically since 1982. Whereas bank loans
were easily available up to the early 1980s, private creditors
became extremely reluctant to provide fresh money after the debt
crisis erupted.
Annual data for the years 198 3-86 are pooled in the OLS-regres-
sions performed. As far as the dependent variables are concerned,
It may be argued that different lending regimes prevail even
within individual countries belonging to this group, insofar as
they still receive some loans on a voluntary basis. However,
credit extension to these countries can safely be assumed to be
dominated by involuntary lending. In the case of Latin America,
concerted bank lending accounted for 92 per cent of total long-
term bank credit commitments [Watson et al., 1988, Table 51].19
we consider net transfers out of long-term public and publicly
guaranteed credits from private creditors plus total non-guaran-
teed private loans (NTR) and disbursements of the same types of
foreign debt (DIS) . Both NTR and DIS are expressed as a propor-
tion of gross national product, in order to account for the dif-
ferent size of the sample economies. Arguably, foreign banks
decide on disbursements in the first place, whereas net transfers
may also be influenced by the debtor countries
1 decisions on
whether or not debt-service payments are effected. With few ex-
ceptions, however, the debtors did not refuse to service external
debt permanently and unilaterally. Debt relief was rather mutual-
ly agreed upon within reschedulings; i.e., the lending behaviour
of banks not only determined credit disbursements but was also
2 relevant for net transfers .
Different sets of explaining variables are considered in order to
test the relevance of economic performance and economic policies,
unfavourable world market developments, and factors influencing
the relative bargaining power of debtors and lenders in determin-
ing the transfer of private credits. If not indicated otherwise,
explaining variables are calculated as two-period averages for
the years t and t-1. In this way, a lagged impact on NTR and DIS
may be captured .
The impact of performance and economic policy variables on net
transfers and disbursements is assessed by estimating the fol-
lowing equations:
For detailed definitions of variables, see the Appendix. Inter-
est payments and loan repayment constitute the difference be-
tween DIS and NTR.
2
Actually, NTR and DIS are closely related for all lending
regimes considered. The Pearson correlation coefficient is
highest in the case of involuntary lending (0.76). Even the
relatively weak correlation between NTR and DIS for constrained
countries not benefiting from involuntary lending (0.31) is
significantly positive at the 1 per cent level of confidence.
3
Additional regressions were run by using the observations for
either period t or t-1. The coefficients of the individual
variables were fairly stable irrespective of the procedure
chosen. The best statistical fit was achieved by applying two-
period averages for the explaining variables. Therefore, the
additional results are not reported.20
(1) NTR = aQ + a^^ GRO + a2 WMSHD + a3 REXR + a4 GOVR
(2) NTR = bQ + b1 INVR + fc>2 WMSHD + b- REXR + b4 DEFR
(3) DIS = CQ + c1 GRO + c2 WMSHD + c3 REXR + c^ GOVR
(4) DIS = dQ + (^ INVR + d2 WMSHD + d3 REXR + d4 DEFR
where :
GRO = real growth in GDP per capita;
INVR = gross fixed capital formation, as per cent of GDP;
WMSHD = change in world export market share; .
REXR = change in real effective exchange rate;
GOVR = government expenditure, as per cent of GDP;
DEFR = government budget deficit, as per cent of GDP.
Positive signs are to be expected for the coefficients of GRO,
2
INVR, WMSHD, and DEFR , if better policies and a favourable
economic performance of sample countries go along with higher
capital inflows; whereas the coefficients of REXR and GOVR
should be negative. The opposite pattern should hold if the coun-
terhypothesis is more relevant in explaining the lending behavi-
our of private creditors. The Krugman line of reasoning is expec-
ted to be relevant for the regime of involuntary lending in the
first place. For the group of non-constrained borrowers, the sign
of the coefficients is left indeterminate by ex-ante considerati-
ons. Due to the high correlation between GRO and INVR, as well as
GOVR and DEFR, the respective variables enter the regressions
alternatively. Multicollinearity problems are kept to the minimum
in this way.
For detailed definitions and sources of data, see the Appendix;
for the economic rationale of selecting the explaining vari-
ables, see Nunnenkamp [1986a; 1986b, Chapter 6].
2 Lower government budget deficits result in higher values of
DEFR.
Negative values of REXR indicate a depreciation of the borro-
wers' currencies.21
Different types of external shocks may add to the loan demand of
Third World borrowers. In the following, we assess the willing-
ness of private creditors to provide additional credits in the
case of deteriorating terms of trade and rising interest rates .
2
This is done by supplementing equations (1) and (2) :
(5) NTR = aQ + a., GRO + a2 WMSHD + a, REXR + a. GOVR + a$ TOT
+ ac IRAT
D
(6) NTR = b^ + b, INVR + b~ WMSHD + b_ REXR + b. DEFR + bc TOT




TOT = annual change in the terms of trade of the sample coun-
tries; v
IRAT = average interest rates for new commitments by private
creditors.
The coefficients of TOT (IRAT) should be negatively (positively)"
signed if banks are prepared to bear part of the external shock
risks. Arguably, risk sharing with private creditors is most
difficult to achieve for the group of credit constrained borro^-
wers not benefiting from involuntary lending.
The basic test format for evaluating the impact of sovereign risk
and relative bargaining power of debtors on capital inflows is
given by equations (7) - (9):
Lower growth of world trade at constant prices may constitute
another reason for higher financing needs. However, real world
imports increased by more than 5 per cent per annum in the
1982-86 period. This was only slightly less than the respective
growth rate for the second naif of the 1970s. Moreover, world
trade picked up remarkably as compared to the years 1980-82.
Consequently, this factor is neglected in the following. Fre-
quently, high current account deficits are considered as an
overall indication of the debtors' exposure to external shocks.
This reasoning is not convincing, however, since domestic poli-
cies influence the country's current account position as well.
2
Equations (5) and (6) were estimated with disbursements (DIS)
as dependent variable as well. The results are not reported
since they do not differ significantly from those achieved for
the NTR-equations.22
(7) NTR = aQ + ax EDTG +
(8) NTR = bQ + b1 EDTG +
(9) NTR = cQ + c1 DSERG +
+ cr SHXDC
TRADE + SHDEX + a4 STDG +
TRADE + b3 SHDEX + b4 STDG +




EDTG : total external debt outstanding, as per cent of GNP;
DSERG : debt service on long-term debt, as per cent of GNP;
TRADE : imports plus exports of sample countries, as per cent
of GDP;
SHDEX : short-term debt, as per cent of the borrowers' exports;
STDG : fluctuation in real GDP per capita of sample countries;
SHXDC : importance of sample countries as export markets for
the creditor nations;
BEXP : exposure of creditor banks in the sample countries.
Variables EDTG and DSERG represent alternative indicators for the
benefits to be reaped by debtors from defaulting on external
debt. They should be negatively signed if standard sovereign risk
arguments hold, i.e., private creditors become increasingly re-
luctant to continue lending, the higher sovereign risks are per-
ceived to be. Positive signs are to be expected if Krugman and
Cohen/Sachs are correct in arguing that increasing default risks
induce the banks to protect their existing claims by additional
lending (see Chapter II, pp. lOf. above). The latter reasoning
mainly refers to the regime of involuntary lending.
Potential costs to be borne by defaulting debtors are reflected
in variables TRADE, SHDEX, and STDG. The borrower's incentives to
default are supposed to be negatively related to the costs of
such a behaviour. Consequently, private creditors would be more
willing to extend further loans,
As before, explaining variables are calculated as two-period
averages for t and t-1. However, EDTG represents debt out-
standing at the end of t-1, as per cent of GNP. For detailed
definitions, see the Appendix.23
- the more the borrower depends on external trade relations
(TRADE),
- the greater the role of short-term trade financing (SHDEX), and
- the stronger the motivation of the borrower to maintain coope-
rative credit relations with the lenders, in order to be able
to smooth fluctuations in domestic absorption by foreign bor-
rowing (STDG).
However, the coefficients of TRADE, SHDEX and STDG would remain
insignificant if the counterhypothesis (advanced by Bulow/Rogoff,
Froot et al., and Sachs) is correct in stating that the threat of
creditors to impose sanctions in the case of default is not
credible.
Variables SHXDC and BEXP provide additional indicators of the
borrower's bargaining position in pressing for further loans. The
bargaining power of debtor countries is perceived to be relative-
ly high if they represent an important export market for the
creditor countries (SHXDC). Moreover, the likelihood of further
(involuntary) lending, which is unprofitable viewed in isolation,
may be particularly high if the loan exposure of banks is con-
siderable; the higher BEXP, the greater the threat that the
financial stability of banks will be seriously affected by de-
faults. Variables SHXDC and BEXP enter the regressions alter-
natively. This procedure is followed because of the strong corre-
lation between both variables .
In additional calculations, equations (7) - (9) are modified in
two respects. Firstly, disbursements (DIS) are substituted for
net transfers (NTR) as the dependent variable. Secondly, equati-
Multicollinearity problems are largely ruled out in this way.
This refers particularly to the regressions run for all 36
sample countries and the 14 credit constrained countries bene-
fiting from involuntary lending. However, multicollinearity
problems may distort the results for the group of non-con-
strained borrowers. In this case, extremely high correlations
exist between EDTG and TRADE, STDG and SHXDC, as well as STDG
and BEXP.24
ons (7) and (9) are supplemented by a variable reflecting unex-
pected changes in economic growth of the sample countries. Two
variants are tried:
GROD1 : difference between real per-capita growth in t and the
average growth rate of the three preceding years;
GR0D2 : difference between real per-capita growth in t and the
average growth rate in the 1970-80 period.
The latter modification refers to an argument advanced by LSchler
[1985, pp. 29ff] . Countries are hypothesized to be more inclined
to default on foreign debt when national income is lower than
previously expected by both lenders and borrowers. The borrower
would have to transfer a higher share of national income to the
creditor if the assumptions on income growth, on which the agree-
ment on the debt-service schedule was based, prove too optimis-
tic. Hence, the benefits of default rise relative to the poten-
tial costs. As in the case of variables EDTG and DSERG, the ef-
fects of GRODl and GROD2 on net transfers depend on the credi-
tors' response to increasing sovereign risks. If the incentive of
banks to protect existing claims dominates, a negative sign of
the respective coefficient is to be expected.
V. Empirical Results
The empirical evidence on the determinants of commercial lending
to developing countries supports our basic hypothesis that a
differentiated approach is required. The existence of different
lending regimes is most evident when credit disbursements re-
present the dependent variable. Turning first to the impact of
economic policies and economic performance (Table 2), none of the
explaining variables considered is found to be statistically
significant for the group of 7 non-constrained debtors. This
confirms our expectations ;of an indeterminate effect of domestic
policies when capital inflows are demand determined. The coun-
tries belonging to the regime of non-constrained lending differ25
Table 2 - The Impact of Economic Policies and Economic Performance on Net Transfers and Disbursements of Credits






























































































(-1.37) (1.89) (0.57) (-2.34) (2.55) 4.7?,
aFor the definition of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. All explaining variables calculated as average
of periods t and t-1. tg/alues in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test);
* 10 per cent level. - ror the definition of lending regimes and the classification of the 36 sample countries, see
Chapter III in the text. - In contrast to all other regression equations, the mean of the respective variable was
substituted for missing data. - TS<plaining variables are lagged by one period, without calculating two-period aver-





















































































































































































































with regard to their borrowing strategies. For example, South
Korea and Malaysia prepaid external debt recently. Political
concerns about the sustainability of debt led to restrictive
attitudes towards raising further loans, irrespective of whether
or not loans could have been used productively.
For the regime of involuntary lending, there is some evidence
supporting the Krugman line of reasoning that bad performance by
a problem borrower leads to higher credit disbursements. Two
coefficients support the view that bad policies and unfavourable
performance encourage further lending in order to protect exis-
ting claims: the positive coefficient of the share of government
expenditure in GDP (GOVR) and the negative sign of the growth
variable (GRO) . However, the coefficients of INVR, WMSHD and
REXR point into the opposite direction. More importantly, from
Table 2 there is no evidence suggesting that, under conditions of
involuntary lending, net transfers are the higher, the more
urgent the need of creditors to protect existing claims is per-
ceived to be.
As far as net transfers are concerned, it is evident that the
lending behaviour of private creditors has changed recently.
Whereas bank lending was largely unaffected by the debtors' do-
mestic policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the estimation
of equations (1) and (2) reveals some significant relationships
for the 1983-86 period. The evidence is strongest for the invest-
ment ratio (INVR) and changes in world export market shares
2
(WMSHD) . Both variables indicate that adjustment efforts by the
debtors are honoured by the creditors.
The former relationship is also found to be significant for the
group of 12 credit constrained countries not benefiting from
involuntary lending. But the coefficient is very small compared
to the regime of involuntary lending.
2
Notwithstanding the strong impact of INVR, the growth variable
(GRO) remains insignificant. This surprising result may be due
to delayed effects of higher investments on economic growth.
However, it is also possible that private creditors honoured
higher investments without paying attention to the efficiency
of investments.27
This finding not only applies to the average of all sample coun-
tries. The same relationship is found for the group of 14 bor-
rowers for which concerted bank lending took place. The positive
impact of a favourable export performance on net transfers is
most pronounced for this group. The investment ratio also figures
prominently in inducing further capital inflows to credit con-
strained borrowers which did not benefit from concerted bank
lending. With the exception of GOVR in the DIS-equation, all
other variables remain insignificant for this regime, however.
This may indicate that is is more difficult for smaller problem
debtors to attract new credits. Yet, no definite conclusions can
be drawn in this respect, considering the additional regressions
run for the small group of constrained borrowers for which the
debt situation improved recently. Most notably, the growth vari-
able is positively related to capital flows to this group. More-
over, it is mainly for this subgroup that a depreciation of the
domestic currency (REXR) has a positive impact on capital in-
flows .
All in all, the empirical evidence presented in Table 2 suggests
that it pays for borrowers to implement economic adjustment pro-
grams. Better policies and favourable performance make private
lenders less reluctant to provide additional funds. However, the
regression analysis also indicates that other than economic poli-
cy and performance variables affect the lending behaviour of
private creditors. Especially in the case of net transfers, the
overall explanatory power of the equations remains limited, as
reflected in low adjusted R
2. The fact that the constant term is
frequently significant points to the relevance of other factors
as well.
It has to be kept in mind that the regressions underlying these
results are run on a rather poor data base. In order to main-
tain a sufficient number of observations, missing values for
individual variables are treated in a different way than in all
other regressions. Instead of completely omitting observations
with missing values, the mean of the respective variable is
substituted for missing data. This procedure may affect the
coefficients of GOVR and REXR particularly.28
The overall statistical fit of the regressions is not improved
when external shock variables are considered additionally. Table
3 shows that the impact of economic policy and performance vari-
ables is not affected by this modification. With only one excep-
tion, changes in terms of trade (TOT) and interest rates (IRAT)
remain insignificant in all equations. Private creditors are not
prepared to compensate unfavourable world market influences by
additional lending. Especially in the case of IRAT, for which
t-values are relatively high, the evidence rather suggests that
net transfers are reduced when external shocks occur .
The regime-specific estimates lend some support to the hypotheses
raised in Chapter II. An inverse relationship between the finan-
cial needs caused by external shocks and the supply of funds pre-
vails for credit constrained countries not benefiting from in-
voluntary lending particularly. Private creditors seem more in-
clined to satisfy the shock-induced loan demand of non-con-
strained borrowers. The fact that the negative coefficients of
TOT and the positive coefficients of IRAT remain insignificant
may be attributed to demand rather than supply factors. The non-
constrained debtors adjusted fairly quickly to unfavourable world
market developments so that the need for additional loans was
reduced.
The statistical fit of our estimations improves considerably when
private lending to Third World countries is viewed from the sov-
ereign risk and bargaining perspective (Tables 4, Al and A2) .
Again it is mainly with regard to credit disbursements that the
distinction of different lending regimes is important (Table Al).
The coefficients of EDTG are insignificant for both subgroups of
credit constrained borrowers, which conflicts with the Eaton/Ger-
That fits into the experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s
when lenders attempted to shift external shock risks to the
debtors. This applies to the risk of rising international in-
terest rates particularly. Elsewhere it is argued that this
shift of risks from creditors to borrowers is not in line with
a macro-economically efficient distribution of risks [Nunnen-
kamp, 1988a]. The creditors which are relatively well equipped
with capital can presumably absorb external shocks with lower


















































































































































































^or the definition of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. All explaining variables calculated as averages of peri-
ods t and t-1. t-values in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test); * 10 per cent
level. - T\Dr the definition of lending regimes and the classification of the 36 sample countries, see Chapter III in the
text.
Source: Own calculations.30
sovitz line of reasoning that lending is negatively related with
an increase in sovereign risk . Moreover, there is some indica-
tion that a higher debt-service burden induces higher loan dis-
bursements, which points to the relevance of the incentive of
lenders to protect existing claims. The latter result is due to
the way in which reschedulings are typically organized. Especi-
ally US-banks insist on the transfer of interest payments in
order to avoid that loans have to be classified as non-per-
forming. Additional credits are granted to enable over-indebted
borrowers to effect interest payments. Not surprisingly, the need
to refinance interest obligations is positively related to the
debt-service burden of problem borrowers.
However, the incentive of banks to ensure that interest payments
are effected by debtors does not result in higher net transfers.
Most notably, all coefficients of EDTG and DSERG are negative and
highly significant, irrespective of the lending regime con-
sidered. This strongly conflicts with the reasoning that lenders
allow for higher net transfers to protect existing claims when
the likelihood of default increases. It is only for unexpected
changes in economic growth of debtor countries that the evidence
is ambiguous (Table A2). When growth expectations are assumed to
be based on the average growth rate of the three years preceding
t (GRODl) lower current growth rates go along with higher net
transfers, particularly for the regime of involuntary lending. In
other words, lenders allow for higher transfers when the debtor's
potential benefits from default rise relative to the costs. How-
ever, this result is reversed when GROD2 is substituted for
GRODl. For medium and higher-income developing countries, there
is some evidence from Nunnenkamp and Picht [1988, Table 4] that
the differences between current growth rates and longer-term
growth trends, rather than short-term changes in growth, affect
the probability of default. Hence, the conclusion can be main-
Standard sovereign risk arguments are supported, however, by
the significantly negative coefficients of EDTG for the average
of all 36 countries and for non-constrained borrowers. But the
latter result should be regarded with considerable caution
since multi-collinearity problems may distort the coefficient



































































































































































































































nFor the definition of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. EDTG: external debt, relative to GNP, outstanding at
the end of period t-1; all other explaining variables calculated as averages of periods t and t-1.. t-values in parenthe-
ses; ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test); * 10 per cent level. - For the definition of
lending regimes and the classification of the 36 sample countries, see Chapter III in the text.
: Own calculations. • • .
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tained that higher benefits from default do not induce higher net
transfers. The results rather support the standard argument ad-
vanced by Eaton/Gersovitz that net transfers are negatively rela-
ted to the benefits which debtors may realize by defaulting on
external debt (see also Chapter II, pp. 8ff.).
The results on the role of sanctions, which may be imposed by
creditors in the case of default, largely confirm standard
sovereign-risk arguments as well . Private creditors are more
inclined to provide additional net transfers when the borrower's
potential costs of default are relatively high. This applies to
all lending regimes, although some differences exist with regard
to the size of coefficients and significance levels.
- The results are strongest in the case of TRADE. With only two
exceptions, Table 4 reveals a significantly positive relation-
ship between net transfers and the debtors' dependence on ex-
ternal trade. The creditors are confident that borrowers will
refrain from repudiating foreign debt as long as their benefits
from continued external trade relations are substantial.
- Similarly, net transfers are higher when short-term trade, fir
nancing (SHDEX) figures prominently. This is especially so for
credit constrained countries benefiting from involuntary lend-
ing; whereas the coefficients of SHDEX remain insignificant for
the group of constrained debtors without involuntary lending.
- The motivation of borrowers to maintain cooperative credit
relations, because otherwise they would not be able to smooth
fluctuations in domestic absorption (STDG), is less relevant in
explaining net transfers. In the case of large over-indebted
borrowers benefiting from involuntary lending, private credi-
tors do not rely on the Eaton/Gersovitz reasoning that debtors
avoid defaults in order to be eligible to borrow for income-
smoothing purposes in the future again. However, private cre-
As far as the following variables are concerned, there are
hardly any differences between Tables 4 and A2. Since the in-
clusion of GROD1 or GROD2 does not affect the coefficients of
the other variables,the interpretation of results can be re-
stricted to the basic NTR-equations of Table 4.33
ditors consider fluctuations in domestic absorption as a safe-
guard against debt repudiation in the case of smaller con-
strained borrowers.
All in all, the counterthreat of sanctions represents an import-
ant determinant of the lending behaviour of private creditors.
Net transfers significantly depend on the potential costs of
default, which indicates that banks rely on the effectiveness of
sanctions .
The evidence on the remaining variables reflecting the bargaining
power of debtor countries, i.e., SHXDC and BEXP, is not very
telling. When net transfers are to be explained, the coefficients
mostly remain insignificant (Table 4) . The hypothesis that deb-
tors take advantage of high bank exposure in pressing for higher
transfers is rejected. The same applies to the hypothesis that
banks are less reluctant to provide additional funds to borrowing
countries which represent relatively important export markets for
2
the creditor nations . When disbursements are the dependent vari-
able, it is only for constrained borrowers not benefiting from
involuntary lending that disbursements are positively related to
export market size (Table Al) . The results achieved for the
regime of involuntary lending do not differ considerably from
The dominant role of the threat of being cut off from external
trade is also evident when disbursements are substituted for
net transfers as the dependent variable (Table A2). The impact
of short-term fluctuations in domestic absorption remains
largely unaffected by this modification. The relevance of trade
financing is considerably reduced.
2
Surprisingly, the coefficients of SHXDC are significantly nega-
tive in some cases. This may be attributed to relatively high
transfers at times when large current account deficits induced
many borrowers to cut imports substantially. Possibly, the
bargaining power of debtors does not depend on market size in
the first place, but rather on the degree to which imports are
suppressed. However, this finding may also result from the
IMF-policies followed in the early phase of the international
debt crisis. The IMF pressed the commercial banks to provide
fresh money to problem borrowers; at the same time, IMF-con-
ditionality imposed on debtors frequently involved import re-
ductions.34
those given in Table 4
VI. Summary and Conclusions
It was the major aim of this paper to assess the empirical rele-
vance of the various conjectures raised in the theoretical lit-
erature on the determinants of commercial lending to developing
countries in the 1980s. This was done on the basis of the hypo-
thesis that lending is no longer governed by a uniform set of
incentives but rather taking place under different lending
regimes. The empirical evidence presented confirms that a dif-
ferentiated approach is required. It is mainly with regard to
credit disbursements that the distinction of different lending
regimes matters. In the case of involuntary lending, there is
some - though rather weak - support for the argument advanced by
Krugman that unfavourable economic performance of debtors leads
to higher credit disbursements. In conflict with the
Eaton/Gersovitz line of reasoning, a negative relationship be-
tween the potential benefits of debtors from default and dis-
bursements does not exist for credit constrained borrowers.
Even under conditions of involuntary lending, however, the incen-
tive of banks to protect existing claims does not result in
higher net transfers. The findings on the determinants of net
transfers are most important since negative net transfers from
which many developing countries suffered in the recent past con-
stitute the central problem in international credit relations.
The empirical evidence can be summarized as follows:
- In contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s, better economic poli-
cies and favourable economic performance of debtors were hon-
oured by private creditors after the debt crisis erupted.
Especially the investment ratio figured prominently in en-
The significantly positive coefficient of BEXP in the DlS-equa-
tion for all 36 countries seems to be largely due to demand ef-
fects in the case of non-constrained debtors.35
couraging further capital inflows. Only for non-constrained
debtors the effect of domestic policies remains indeterminate
since capital inflows are demand determined. The counterhypo-
thesis that policy-rinduced improvements in economic performance
of problem borrowers result in reduced net transfers has to be
rejected.
- Private creditors were not prepared to compensate unfavourable
world market developments by additional lending. It proved to
be most difficult for constrained borrowers not benefiting from
involuntary lending to attract further capital inflows when
they were hit by external shocks.
- Standard sovereign risk arguments dominate when net transfers
are to be explained. Increasing default risks added to the
reluctance of private creditors to provide additional trans-
fers. In deciding on whether or not to continue lending, banks
relied on the effectiveness of trade sanctions particularly.
From these findings, several conclusions can be drawn as to how
to overcome the reluctance of commercial banks to transfer fur-
ther capital and to improve the growth prospects of today's
problem borrowers. The reversal of international capital flows
since 1982 was typically due to drastically reduced inflows of
new bank credits, rather than higher debt-service obligations.
The refusal of private creditors to provide additional net trans-
fers can be partly attributed to the fact that far-reaching and
consistent economic policy reforms have not yet been introduced
by most problem borrowers. It is thus likely to pay for borrowers
to intensify adjustment efforts. Policy reforms are indispensable
to restore the international creditworthiness of credit con-
strained debtors.
Arguably, adjustment programs are a necessary, but not a suffici-
ent condition for the resumption of commercial bank lending to
developing countries on a voluntary basis [Nunnenkamp, 1988a].
This is because the commitment to re-orientate economic policies36
is often not credible. The creditors face considerable uncertain-
ties whether or not borrowers will stick to the pre-announced
policy course, and whether or not they will finally decide to
default on their external debt. Presently, international transfer
negotiations are characterized by informational asymmetries and
the threat that borrowers refuse to service external debt al-
though they are able to pay.
It is most important to reduce sovereign risks in international
lending, in order to encourage private creditors to resume
lending to developing countries. The problem of lacking enforce-
ability of the creditors
1 claims could be solved within the scope
of an internationally binding legal system. While no system of
this kind exists, transfer agreements must be self-enforcing if
sovereign risks are to be reduced. Incentives should be created
which render it unfavourable for debtors to suspend debt-service
payments although they are able to pay. This may be achieved by
supplementing the traditional credit contracts by a third-party
contract [for an interesting proposal in this respect, see
Stuven, 1988].
The creditors' willingness to share the credit risks triggered
off by unfavourable world market developments is likely to in-
crease, if the debtors' incentives are strengthened to meet debt
obligations by pursuing efficient policies. Hence, we would make
considerable headway towards a macro-economically efficient dis-
tribution of credit risks between debtors and creditors, and the
capital outflow out of developing countries can be checked.37
Appendix; Definition of Variables
As far as the dependent variable is concerned, i.e. capital flows
to developing countries from private creditors, we refer to
credit disbursements (DIS) and net transfers (NTR; i.e. DIS minus
interest and amortization payments) as given in the World Bank's
World Debt Tables. Both variables are expressed as a share of GNP
and include long-term public and publicly guaranteed credits from
private creditors as well as total non-guaranteed private
credits. For non-guaranteed private debt, the differentiation
between private and official creditors is not available for most
of our sample countries. So we decided to include total non-
guaranteed private debt. The distortions arising from this proce-
dure remain minimal, as indicated by the marginal role of offici-
al creditors for this type of debt in the case of borrowing coun-
tries for which disaggregated data is available. Short-term debt
is completely omitted since the calculation of net transfers is
not possible and the role of private creditors cannot be identi-
fied.
The following explaining variables are considered in order to
assess the impact of economic performance and economic policies
of debtor countries on the lending behaviour of private credi-
tors:
GRO : annual rate of growth in real GDP per capita as given
in UNCTAD [1988];
INVR : gross fixed capital formation, as per cent of GDP [IMF,
International Financial Statistics];
WMSHD : annual change in world export market shares of sample
countries, calculated from export figures in current
prices as given in IMF, International Financial Statis-
tics (line 70d), deflated by export unit values presen-
ted in UNCTAD [1988];
REXR : annual change in real effective exchange rates, based
on IMF-data on nominal exchange rates (partner coun-
tries' currencies per unit of domestic currencies of
sample countries) and consumer prices; trade weights
(shares in world trade) calculated from International
Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade Statis-38
tics ;
GOVR : government expenditure, as per cent of GDP [IMF, Inter-
national Financial Statistics];
DEFR : government budget deficit, as per cent of GDP [IMF,
International Financial Statistics].
The exposure of sample countries to external shocks is captured
by the following indicators:
TOT : annual change in the terms of trade, proxied by unit
value indices given in UNCTAD [1988];
IRAT : average interest rates of new commitments by private
creditors [World Bank, World Debt Tables].
The following variables enter the analysis on the impact of
sovereign risk and relative bargaining power of borrowers and
lenders on private lending to Third World countries:
EDTG : total external debt of sample countries (short-term
debt included) , as per cent of GNP [World Bank, World
Debt Tables];
DSERG : total debt service on long-term debt of sample coun-
tries, as per cent of GNP [World Bank, World Debt
Tables];
GR0D1 : difference between real per-capita growth of sample
countries in period t and the average growth rate of
the three preceding periods [based on UNCTAD, 1988];
GROD2 : difference between real per-capita growth of sample
countries in period t and the average growth rate in
the 1970-80 period [based on UNCTAD, 1988];
STDG : fluctuation in real GDP per capita of sample countries,
as reflected in the standard deviation for the 1970-81
period [based on IMF, International Financial Statis-
tics] ;
TRADE : imports plus exports of sample countries, as per cent
of GDP [calculated from national accounts in IMF, In-
ternational Financial Statistics];
For the formula applied and its economic justification, see
Fischer, Spinanger [1986, pp. 83ff.].39
SHDEX : short-term debt of sample countries, as per cent of the
borrowers
1 exports of goods and services [World Bank,
World Debt Tables];
SHXDC : importance of sample countries as an export market for
the developed countries; proxied by the imports of
sample countries from the European Community, Japan,
and the United States, as per cent of the latter coun-
tries' total exports [IMF, Direction of Trade Statis-
tics] ;
BEXP : exposure of Western commercial banks in the sample
countries; proxied by total amounts owed US banks by
sample countries, as per cent of the total capital of
reporting US banks [Federal Reserve System, Country Ex-


































































































































































































































the definition of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. EDTG: external debt, relative to GNP, outstanding at the
end of period t-1; all other explaining variables calculated as averages of periods t and t-1. J:-values in parentheses; ** in-
dicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test); * 10 per cent level. - HFor the definition of lending
regimes and the classification of the 36 sample countries, see Chapter III in the text.
Source: Own calculations.41











































































































































































































































































































































the definition of variables and data sources, see the Appendix. EDTG: external debt, relative to GNP, outstanding at the
end of period t-1; all other explaining variables calculated as averages of periods t andt-1. t-values in parentheses; ** in-
dicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test); * 10 per cent level. - T"or the definition of lending regimes
and the classification of the 36 sample countries, see Chapter III in the text.
Source: Otm calculations.42
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